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For the pairs that had initially been rated 
  disparately, there was no change in the rat-
ings post-choice.
Despite the lack of differences in rat-
ings pre-choice, neuroimaging revealed a 
region in the caudate nucleus that tracked 
preference for the selected option even 
before revaluation was induced by the 
decision (Sharot et  al. 2009, Figure  3b). 
The authors also demonstrated a further 
increase in activation for the selected option 
over rejected option post-choice within the 
right caudate (Sharot et al. 2009, Figure 3c). 
Finally, the post-choice increase in activa-
tion difference between the selected and 
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One of the principal goals of cognitive 
neuroscience is to illuminate aspects of 
psychological processes that are inaccessi-
ble to behavioral approaches. In many cases, 
neural data can promote breakthroughs in 
scientiﬁ  c understanding of psychological 
phenomena by facilitating adjudication 
between competing theories, implicating 
previously unknown mediating processes, 
or providing new mechanistic accounts 
of behavior. One such phenomenon that 
has been the focus of much investigation 
in social psychology is the effect of choice 
on perceived value. After being forced to 
choose between two equally valued options, 
such as two highly similar appliances, 
most people will subsequently rate their 
selected option more positively and the 
rejected option more negatively than they 
would have originally (Brehm, 1956). While 
this effect has been well-documented in the 
behavioral literature, little is known about 
the mechanisms that drive this alteration in 
perceived value. For example, these shifts in 
preference could indicate a need to reduce 
cognitive dissonance, or represent memory 
and context-dependent changes in stimulus 
representation during the decision period. 
Understanding the neural correlates associ-
ated with post-choice revaluations can help 
provide valuable insights in adjudicating 
between these mechanisms.
In a recent edition of the Journal of 
Neuroscience, Sharot et al. (2009) sought to 
delineate the neural mechanisms under-
lying post-choice revaluation of expected 
hedonic value using functional neuroimag-
ing. Participants initially rated on a 6-point 
scale how happy they would be   travelling 
to 80 different vacation   destinations. 
Subsequently, participants chose between 
these destinations presented in pairs. 
Critically, these pairs were personalized 
for each participant such that one-third 
involved two destinations they had ini-
tially rated very differently and two-thirds 
combined destinations they had rated 
equally. Consistent with existing social 
psychology literature, participants rated 
the selected destinations as more pleasant 
and the rejected destinations as less pleas-
ant after being forced to choose between 
pairs of destinations that had initially been 
rated equally (Sharot et al. 2009, Figure 1). 
FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the anatomical variability in activation of the caudate nucleus across the 
various contrasts in Sharot et al. (2009) study. Voxel-sized boxes (2 × 2 × 3 mm) centered on the peak 
co-ordinates for each of the contrasts are overlaid in red on the SPM5 T1 template brain. The right caudate 
nucleus, deﬁ  ned according to the Talairach Daemon atlas using the WFU PickAtlas tool, is additionally 
overlaid in blue. Slices are displayed from y = −24 to y = 24 in increments of 4 mm.Venkatraman et al.  Post-choice revaluation of hedonic preferences
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  August 2009  | Volume 3  |  Article 18  |  2
rejected options predicted the magnitude 
of behavioral changes in valuation across 
individuals (Sharot et al. 2009, Figure 3d). 
Since a similar region in the caudate nucleus 
tracked preference ratings for the different 
destinations in an independent parametric 
analysis (after controlling for arousal, viv-
idness and familiarity), the authors associ-
ate activation in the caudate nucleus with 
expected hedonic value.
This well-controlled study makes a 
signiﬁ   cant contribution to the existing 
behavioral literature. First, it uses a clever 
adaptation of traditional behavioral para-
digms used to study post-choice revalua-
tion. Previous experiments often employed 
a limited number of decisions, while this 
study was able to assess numerous deci-
sions, making it better suited for neuroim-
aging methods. Additionally, Sharot and 
colleagues demonstrate that activation in 
the caudate nucleus tracks decision prefer-
ences before participants even know they 
will choose between two items. These ﬁ  nd-
ings highlight the importance of using neu-
roimaging methods to provide insights into 
cognitive processes that may be inaccessible 
to typical behavioral measures.
While the results of this study are illumi-
nating, it is a little surprising that hedonic 
value in this task is associated with activa-
tion in the caudate nucleus. In most stud-
ies, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and 
ventral striatum have often been associated 
with computing values and tracking hedonic 
preferences (Hare et  al., 2008; Seymour 
et al.,  2007) while the caudate nucleus 
has often been associated with reinforce-
ment of an action rather than the rewards 
themselves (Balleine et al., 2007; O’Doherty 
et al., 2004). Additionally, interpreting the 
functional role of the caudate nucleus in 
this study is further complicated by the 
vast anatomical variability across the dif-
ferent contrasts performed (see Figure 1). 
Since other studies provide evidence for 
functional specialization within the vari-
ous regions of the caudate (Balleine et al., 
2007; Yin and Knowlton, 2006), it is neces-
sary to resolve this anatomical variability to 
fully appreciate the mechanisms underlying 
valuation of stimuli pre- and post-choice.
While this experiment provides insight 
into the post-choice revaluation of options, 
it does little to clarify the various mecha-
nisms by which these alterations in per-
ceived value might occur. One such account 
appeals to cognitive dissonance theory. 
Choosing between two equally attractive 
alternatives typically causes cognitive dis-
comfort since the beneﬁ  cial aspects of the 
rejected option and the limitations of the 
selected option conﬂ  ict with the decision. 
In order to resolve this tension, both stimuli 
are revalued. An alternative explanation 
suggests that these revaluations are driven 
by contextual or memory-driven processes 
that occur during the choice period rather 
than the reduction of cognitive dissonance. 
Participants may retrieve additional new 
information about a vacation or concep-
tualize its merits differently when it is paired 
with its competing destination (Dougherty 
et al., 2003). Such an explanation argues for 
an expansion of the decision space, or the 
amount of information that is incorporated 
into the decision. This alternative hypoth-
esis seems particularly likely within the 
present study, in which the choice stimuli 
are richly detailed and prone to trigger 
many associations.
Whereas this memory-driven account 
of the data involves stimulus elaboration 
and expansion of the decision space, it also 
seems feasible that contextual updating 
during the decision could result in simpli-
ﬁ  cation of decision space. Consistent with 
this notion, a large set of behavioral stud-
ies shows consistent preference reversals 
between decisions made in a single evalua-
tion or a joint evaluation mode (Hsee et al., 
1999). In Sharot et al., when rating vaca-
tions in isolation, participants could focus 
on several cognitive aspects like feasibility 
of travel, things to do at each destination, 
travel time and others in addition to pure 
hedonic preferences. While the behavio-
ral ratings would represent an integrated 
preference across all these factors, they 
could still differ in terms of the underly-
ing neural mechanisms (McClure et  al., 
2004). Subsequently, when forced to evalu-
ate between two similarly rated vacations, 
subjects may explicitly focus on attributes 
that help discriminate between the two des-
tinations, thus limiting the decision space. 
This shift could result in a greater reliance 
on pure hedonic preferences, especially 
given the hypothetical nature of the task and 
hence, subjects tend to choose destinations 
that are associated with greater hedonic 
value relative to other cognitive aspects 
(i.e. a vacation in Thailand might be lot 
more attractive than Greece when you do 
not have to consider factors like long travel 
times and cost). This increased emphasis on 
hedonic aspects for subsequently selected 
destinations might explain greater activa-
tion in caudate during the pre-choice sin-
gle evaluation phase. In contrast, increased 
pre-choice activation in the middle frontal 
gyrus for subsequently rejected destinations 
might represent the greater emphasis on 
cognitive and utilitarian appraisals for these 
destinations pre-choice, consistent with the 
postulated role of this region in facilitat-
ing cognitive aspects of decision making 
(McClure et al., 2004; Sanfey et al., 2003). 
Choosing a destination under this strategy 
may also emphasize the positive hedonic 
aspects of the selected stimulus, leading 
to greater subsequent ratings of perceived 
value for these destinations over the rejected 
ones, as well as enhanced activation in the 
caudate nucleus.
Several strategies could be employed 
to adjudicate between these competing 
accounts of the data in future studies. One 
strategy is to vary the complexity and com-
parability of the stimuli. If stimuli are simple 
and closely matched (e.g., rating and choos-
ing between different colored M&Ms), it is 
unlikely that new information would come 
to mind during the choice or that any deci-
sion factors are differentially emphasized, 
and hence any revaluations would stem 
from a reduction of cognitive dissonance. 
Another strategy is to use the neuroimaging 
data from the decision phase to character-
ize the functional networks engaged dur-
ing choices that result in large post-choice 
changes in valuation compared to those 
that result in small changes. Recruitment of 
memory-related regions for trials that sub-
sequently result in larger revaluation would 
lend preliminary support for additional 
information entering the decision space. 
Alternatively, recruitment of regions associ-
ated with conﬂ  ict detection and resolution, 
such as the anterior cingulate cortex and 
lateral prefrontal cortex, might help support 
a cognitive dissonance account of the data. 
Neuroimaging data from the choice period 
may additionally speak to whether the cau-
date actively participates in value updating 
during the decision, or whether it is a pas-
sive reﬂ  ection of hedonic value during the 
rating periods only. By combining these 
functional comparisons with manipula-
tions designed to emphasize one account 
over another, such as varying the complexity Venkatraman et al.  Post-choice revaluation of hedonic preferences
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of the choice stimuli, we can obtain con-
ﬁ  rmatory evidence about the underlying 
mechanisms and their neural correlates. 
Finally, the neuroimaging data from the 
pre-choice rating period could be further 
investigated with respect to the magnitude 
of subsequent revaluation. If larger revalua-
tion is associated with greater disparity in 
pre-choice caudate activity between selected 
and rejected stimuli, then revaluation likely 
reﬂ  ects ampliﬁ  cation of pre-existing dif-
ferences in implicit preference, whereas a 
smaller pre-choice disparity would support 
a traditional cognitive dissonance account 
and corresponding revaluation during the 
choice period. All of these approaches could 
help disambiguate the mechanisms contrib-
uting to post-choice revaluation.
This study by Sharot and colleagues 
provides an important ﬁ  rst step in uncov-
ering the neural correlates of post-choice 
revaluation. The demonstration of pre-
choice differences in caudate activation 
predicting subsequent decisions is remark-
able and raises numerous questions about 
the underlying assumptions implicit in 
designs traditionally used to study these 
effects. However, as emphasized above, 
future research is necessary to delineate 
the underlying mechanisms contributing 
to post-choice changes in perceived value.
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